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Condensation 
The obstetrical community should adopt the professional responsibility model of 
obstetric ethics and abandon conceptually and clinically inadequate rights-based 
models. 
Short Title: The Professional Responsibility Model of Obstetric Ethics 
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Abstract 
Obstetric ethics is sometimes represented by polarized views. One extreme asserts the 
rights of the rights of the fetus as the overwhelming ethical consideration. Another 
extreme asserts the pregnant woman as the overwhelming ethical consideration. Both 
assertions are overly simplistic. Such oversimplification is called reductionism. This 
paper explains the fallacy of rights-based reductionism and two models of obstetric 
ethics based on it and explains why the fetal rights reductionism model and the 
pregnant woman's rights reductionism model result in conceptual and clinical failure and 
therefore should be abandoned. The paper argues for the professional responsibility 
model of obstetric ethics, which emphasizes the importance of medical science and 
compassionate clinical care of both the pregnant and fetal patient. The result is that 
responsible medical care overrides the extremes of clashing rights. 
KeyWords 
Beneficence, ethical reductionism, fetus as a patient, professional responsibility, respect 
for autonomy, patients' rights 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every obstetrician is challenged by the clashing demands of fetal rights versus 
maternal rights.1-4 Their resulting polarization forces the obstetrician into the 
unwelcome role of Odysseus struggling to avoid the mythical sea monsters of Scylla 
and Charybdis, either one which could devour his ship and crew if he sailed too close. 
To starboard, stand, like Scylla, the exclusive assertions of the rights of the fetus.s To 
port, stand, just as unyielding, stand Charybdis, the exclusive assertions of the rights of 
the pregnant woman. Ethical peril awaits the obstetrician who sails too close to either 
extreme of rights, just as deadly peril did for Odysseus and his crew. 
Models of obstetric ethics based on rights-based extremes commit the fallacy of 
rights-based reductionism. The purposes of this paper are to explain the fallacy of 
rights-based ethical reductionism and two models of obstetric ethics based on it, explain 
why these models of rights-based reductionism are not acceptable, and put forward an 
ethically justified and clinically applicable alternative, the professional responsibility 
model. The professional responsibility model equips the obstetrician to successfully 
navigate the perils of rights-based Scylla and Charybdis by focusing on professional 
responsibility to and for patients. Just as Odysseus bore the responsibility to protect his 
crew, the obstetrician bears the responsibility to protect both the pregnant and fetal 
patient. 
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THE FALLACY OF RIGHTS-BASED REDUCTIONISM 
The fallacy of rights-based reductionism can be understood by analogy to the 
fallacy of biological reductionism or oversimplification of scientific models of disease and 
health. As an antidote to biological reductionism in medicine, George Engel made a 
sentinel contribution with his introduction of the biopsychosocial concept of health and 
disease.6-9 In his classic paper in Science Engel summarized the biomedical model: 
The dominant model of disease is biomedical, with molecular biology its basic 
scientific disCipline. It assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations 
from the norm of measurable biological (somatic) variables. It leaves no room 
within its framework for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of 
illness.... the biomedical model embraces both reductionism, the philosophic 
view that complex phenomena are ultimately derived from a single primary 
principle, and mind-body dualism, the doctrine that separates the mental from the 
somatic. Here the reductionist primary principle is physicalistic; that is, it 
assumes that the language of chemistry and physics will ultimately suffice to 
explain biologic phenomena.?' pp. 39-40 
The history of biological reductionism stands in contrast to traditional Chinese 
medicine, based on the concept of qi, which was understood to have both physical and 
spiritual components in an "incessant process of transformation.,,10 This history also 
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stands in contrast to more holistic strands in the history of Westem medicine, e.g., 
naturopathy and homeopathy. Here we sketch a complicated history.11 
Ancient Hippocratic physicians understood all diseases to be an interaction of the 
four humors. According to the Hippocratic or Coan school of medicine, diseases 
resulted from imbalances among blood, phlegm, black bile. and yellow bile. This theory 
recognized the existence of environmental factors, such as prevailing wind direction, but 
the explanation of the direct causes of disease and of their subsequent clinical 
management, mainly by modest changes in diet and exercise and the use of mild 
medications, appealed to what they took to be the biologically fundamental realities, the 
humors. Later anatomy became fundamental and the focus shifted to the skeleton and 
organs as the seat of diseases. Debates arose about more aggressive or "heroic" 
treatment, especially surgery, to correct abnormal anatomy. Physiology, the science of 
the functions of organs and then organ systems, then displaced anatomy as 
fundamental. Medications and potions to correct symptoms of abnormal function 
became increasingly important. The discovery of microbes led to a dramatic conceptual 
shift. The seat of disease was now understood to be microscopic, which led to an 
increased understanding of the pathophysiology and treatment of infections. We are 
now well into the era of genomic medicine, in which the genome supersedes the 
microbe as a senior partner in explaining the biological basis of health and disease. 
Engel's concern was that equating health and disease with biological 
fundamentals commits physicians to a clinically inadequate model of health and disease 
that results in inadequate diagnosis, prevention, and treatment. For example, a married 
6 
woman of child-bearing years presents with a complaint of infertility. The biomedical 
model focuses on the mechanisms of ovarian, tubal, uterine, and sperm function. The 
biopsychosocial model includes this focus but rejects it as the exclusive focus, because 
it is clinically incomplete and could result in unneeded, invasive, and expensive work-up 
and assisted reproduction. A psychosocial assessment goes on to identify 
psychological and social factors such as stress in the workplace or household, which 
would be elicited only by a more complete history and would be missed by a work-up for 
impaired anatomy of reproduction. The biopsychosocial model is clinically crucial 
because it reminds the obstetrician that psychosocial, as well as anatomic and 
pathophysiologic factors can result in reproductive failure. 
As this example illustrates, Engel's concern was not the limitations of our 
scientific knowledge at any given time about what is assumed biologically fundamental 
in obstetrics. His point was that even a very sophisticated scientific fund of knowledge 
about, for example, human reproduction, will be scientifically and therefore clinically 
fallacious if it focuses only on the biological aspects of health and disease, e.g., the 
basic science mechanisms of reproduction, mistaking these mechanisms of disease for 
an adequate model of the totality of the disease. Incorporating the psychological and 
social dimensions is required to have a clinically adequate model to guide obstetric care 
and thereby avoid clinical tunnel vision. Fulfilling the requirements of the biomedical 
model by finding an anatomic cause for infertility, may be very fulfilling for the physician 
on a narrowly scientific basis, but not for the patient, whose complaint will remain 
inadequately addressed if her infertility is also a function of unidentified and therefore 
unmanaged psychosocial factors. 
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Engel's main point remains germane: the biomedical model is becomes a fallacy 
when it is assumed to be complete. The remedy is to recognize that it is scientifically 
and clinically incomplete and misleading. Comprehensive clinical judgment requires 
attention to the clinically relevant biomedical and the clinically relevant psychosocial 
aspects of pregnancy. 
There is an analogous fallacious reductionism in obstetric ethics. The phrase, 
"ethical reductionism," has been used,12 but not in a way that makes this analogy 
explicit. The fallacy of ethical reductionism occurs when a model for ethics appeals to 
one ethical concept in complex clinical circumstances that by their very nature require 
consideration of complementary concepts. Rights-based reductionism in obstetric 
ethics bases it exclusively on the rights of either the pregnant woman or the fetus and 
ignore other clinically relevant ethical concepts. (Table 1) 
The fallacy of right-based reductionism shapes the current abortion controversy. 
Consider first the model of obstetric ethics based on unconditional fetal rights, 
especially the right to life. The logic of this concept means that fetal rights always 
override the rights of the pregnant woman. Termination of pregnancy at any gestational 
age or for any reason is therefore impermissible, regardless of whether the pregnancy is 
voluntary or not. Consider, next, the concept of the woman's unconditional rights, 
especially the right to control her body. The logic of this concept means that the 
pregnant woman's rights always override fetal rights. Termination of pregnancy is 
therefore permissible at any gestational age. 13 (Table 1) 
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Rights-talk has an undeniable appeal, because rights-talk seems so clear-cut: 
one either has rights or one does not and, if one does, others must respect one's rights. 
This is a false veneer of certainty masking the fact that there is significant controversy 
about the nature and limits of fetal and maternal rights. Debating rights results in 
intractable disputes, since rights are based on so many factors, including cultural, 
political, and religious beliefs that do not lend themselves to compromise and are 
peripheral to the physician-patient relationship. 
It is obvious that a pregnant woman has rights, including an unconditional right to 
control what happens to her body. There is enormous dispute about whether that right 
should be understood to come with limits or with no exceptions throughout the entire 
pregnancy. Professional integrity, for example, sets justified limits on the preferences of 
pregnant women. 14,15 
Claims that the fetus has rights, especially an unconditional right to life, are in 
endless dispute. Some take the view that the fetus has no rights while others assert 
strong rights of the fetus. Those who assert that the fetus has rights must - but often in 
fact do not - recognize that the world's religions and their moral theologies are not in 
agreement.16-20 Nor are philosophers.13 Indeed, there is no single authoritative 
perspective from which the incompatible differences of these diverse views on fetal 
rights can be resolved.21 Such an authoritative source would have to be acceptable to 
all of the competing accounts and conceptual frameworks. This is not achievable 
because of an unavoidable fact. There is profound and irresolvable disagreement 
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between different religious and cultural traditions, within such traditions, and between 
religious and secular views on fetal rights. 
The pregnant woman's rights reductionism model appears in the literature on 
intrapartum management. This model asserts the unconditional right of the pregnant 
woman to control her body and the implicit position that the fetus has no rights. The 
pregnant woman has rights and her rights control performance of cesarean delivery: " 
... the moral and legal primacy of the competent, informed pregnant woman in decision 
making is overwhelming.,,22, p. 1213 A recent expression of this model takes what at first 
seems a non-reductionist approach. Its authors acknowledge patient safety as a ''first­
order issue"23, p. 341 and support what they call "restrictive guidelines" based on 
23protecting the life and health of pregnant women. However, they abandon this more 
nuanced approach in favor of an exclusive emphasis on the pregnant woman's rights 
reductionism model when they assert: "Crucially, even when restrictive guidelines are 
warranted the rights of pregnant women to bodily integrity must be maintained.,,23, p. 343 
Some express the model in explicit terms, e.g., that "women have fully endowed rights 
that do not diminish with conception, nor progressively degrade as pregnancy advances 
to viability and birth."24, p. 318 Another example is the assertion of the pregnant woman's 
autonomy as an "unrestricted negative right," i.e., an unconditional right to non­
interference with refusal of cesarean delivery: "autonomy is an inter-relational right­
ultimately there is no circumstance in which someone should be brought to an operating 
room against their will."25 The pregnant woman's rights reductionism model also 
grounds claims to the rights of pregnant women to have a clinically non-indicated 
cesarean delivery. 26-28 
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Rights-based reductionism models invite the unwary obstetrician to be satisfied 
with an oversimplified solution: deciding whose rights win out in a zero-sum game ­
those of the pregnant woman or those of the fetus. This solution, however it might 
appeal to us in its simplicity, is ethically and clinically inadequate. Rights-based 
reductionism in obstetric ethics is a fallacy. 
THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL OF OBSTETRICS ETHICS 
Because they are fallacious, rights-based reductionism models distort the 
fundamental nature of the relationship of a physician to his or her patients, a 
relationship of professional ethical obligations. (Table 1) The professional obligations of 
the obstetrician-gynecologist originate in the ethical concept of medicine as a 
profession. This concept was introduced into the history of medicine by two remarkable 
British physician-ethicists: John Gregory (1724-1773) of Scotland and Thomas Percival 
(1740-1804) of England. This concept requires the physician to make three 
commitments: (1) becoming and remaining scientifically, ethically, and clinically 
competent; (2) protecting and promoting the health-related and other interests of the 
patient as the primary concern and motivation; and (3) preserving and strengthening 
medicine as what Percival called a "public trust," a social institution that exists primarily 
for the benefit of society not its members (in contrast to the concept of medicine as a 
merchant gUild).29 The ethical concept of medicine as a profession makes assumption 
of fiduciary responsibility the defining feature of the physician-patient relationship. In 
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the professional responsibility model obstetricians have ethical obligations to both the 
pregnant and fetal patient.21 ,3o 
There are two views on the health-related interests of the patient, both of which 
must be taken into account.21 The first perspective, which is dismissed by faliaciolJs 
rights-based reductionism, is clinical. This clinical view is shaped by evidence-based 
clinical judgment about diagnostic and therapeutic measures that are reliably expected 
to result in a greater balance of clinical goods over clinical harms, understood in 
biopsychosocial terms. This perspective is expressed by the principle of 
beneficence.21 ,31 The second perspective is the patient's, shaped by her evidence-
based and other judgments about which diagnostic and therapeutic interventions are 
expected to result in a greater balance of clinical benefits over harms. This view is 
expressed by the principle of respect for autonomy.19,31 Respect for the autonomy of 
the pregnant woman who is a patient requires more than acknowledging and 
implementing rights. Respect for autonomy should also be understood in 
biopsychosocial terms: the physician should acknowledge and respect the integrity of 
the patient's values and beliefs, especially those that she has for her pregnancy. An 
individual's values and beliefs are drawn from multiple social sources, including one's 
family upbringing, culture, and religion. These psychosocial sources of a patient's 
values and beliefs should always be acknowledged and respected. Showing such 
respect helps to promote a sense of psychological safety and security that contribute 
significantly to a strong physician-patient relationship. Patients use their values and 
beliefs to assess the medically reasonable alternatives that are offered or 
recommended to them in the informed consent process, which should be used to 
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support the very important psychosocial values of trust and respect. The obstetrician 
has both beneficence-based and autonomy-based obligations to the pregnant woman. 
(Table 1) 
The ethical concept of a human being becoming a patient is based on the 
principle of beneficence and has two components. The human being is presented to a 
physician and there exist clinical interventions that are reliably expected to clinically 
benefit that human being.21 A pregnant woman becomes a patient when she is 
presented for obstetrical care. A fetus becomes a patient in a more complex fashion. 
We have argued elsewhere that the viable fetus becomes a patient when the pregnant 
woman is presented for obstetrical care.21 The obstetrician has beneficence-based 
obligations to the viable fetal patient. (Table 1) We have also argued elsewhere that 
the pre-viable fetus becomes a patient when the pregnant woman is presented for 
obstetrical care and the pregnant woman confers the moral status of being a patient on 
her fetus, on the basis of her own values and beliefs.21 When the pregnant confers the 
status of patienthood on her fetus, the obstetrician has beneficence-based obligations to 
it as a fetal patient. When she does not do so, no beneficence-based obligations to the 
fetus exist. (Table 1) 
Obstetricians can be certain when they have a professional relationship with a 
patient and therefore responsibility to and for that patient: the pregnant woman or fetus 
is presented to the obstetrician-gynecologist and there exist clinical interventions that 
reliable expected to benefit the patient clinically. Both of these criteria for when a 
human being becomes a patient are easy to apply clinically and universally applicable.21 
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The fallacy of rights-based reductionism models is that they only appear to be 
easy to apply clinically and to be universally applicable. Their apparent robustness 
creates a veneer of certainty that, when subject to critical scrutiny, collapses. Consider 
first the fetal rights reductionism model. Having rights is a function of the clinical reality 
of having autonomy. In the most rigorous accounts of it having autonomy is achieved 
only when an individual is capable of valuing himself or herself without regard to the 
moral judgments of others.32 This complex, very cognitively demanding self-awareness 
and judgment require at the very least self-consciousness and social interaction. The 
biological fact is that at all gestational ages the immature developmental status of the 
fetus's central nervous system and its location in utero is such that it cannot yet support 
the complexity of psychosocial activity that generates autonomy as a clinical reality; 
This outcome is not a problem for the professional responsibility model, because the 
ethical concept of the fetus as a patient makes no reference to the autonomy of the 
fetus and therefore no reference to fetal rights. The fetal rights reductionism model, 
despite its simplicity and powerful initial appeal, is fallacious because it leads obstetric 
ethics into conceptual and clinical failure. This model therefore should be abandoned. 
Consider next the pregnant woman's rights reductionism model. This model 
requires the obstetrician to implement birth plans that unconditionally exclude cesarean 
delivery or the unconditional right to planned home birth. This model eliminates the 
obstetrician's beneficence-based obligations to both the pregnant and fetal patients and 
therefore reduces the obstetrician to a mere automaton. This model also has absurd 
implications, e.g., ruling out as potential paternalism strongly and repeatedly 
recommending that pregnant women who abuse tobacco and alcohol seek help and be 
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supported in doing so. Respect for the pregnant woman's rights allows simply 
accepting such clinically choices by patients because they have made clinically unwise, 
but autonomous, choices. This is abandonment from the perspective of professional 
responsibility for patients. The pregnant woman's rights reductionism model, despite its 
simplicity and powerful appeal for many, is fallacious because it leads obstetric ethics to 
conceptual and clinical failure. This model therefore also should be abandoned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Scylla and Charybdis of rights-based reductionism models should be 
abandoned and replaced by the professional responsibility model. By basing obstetric 
practice on the professional responsibility model of obstetric ethics, the obstetrician 
creates a solid foundation for the care of the pregnant and fetal patient: the physician­
patient relationship as a professional commitment. 
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Table 1: Three Models of Obstetric Ethics 
Fetal Rights 
Reductionism 
Model 
Professional 
Responsibility 
Model 
Pregnant 
Woman's 
Rights 
• Reductionism 
Model 
Pregnant Woman 
Pre-viable Fetus 
Viable Fetus 
Pregnant woman's 
rights 
systematically 
secondary to fetal 
rights 
! 
Fetal rights 
systematica lIy 
override woman's 
rights 
Fetal rights 
systematically 
override woman's 
rights 
Autonomy-based 
and beneficence 
obligations 
Beneficence-based 
obligations, if the 
status of 
patienthood is 
determined by the 
pregnant woman 
Beneficence-based 
obligations 
I 
Pregnant 
woman's 
rights 
systematically 
override fetal 
rights 
Fetal rights 
systematically 
secondary to 
woman's 
rights 
Fetal rights 
systematically 
secondary to 
woman's 
rights 
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